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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
DRUMMOND FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
LLC; et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
TMX FINANCE HOLDINGS, INC.; et al., 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 
2014CV253677 
Business Case Div. 4 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES 
The above styled action is before the Court on various motions and discovery disputes. 
Having considered the record, the Court finds and orders as follows: 1 
I. DISCOVERY RELATED DISPUTES 
The Court previously entered a comprehensive Order on Pending Motions and Requests 
("Discovery Order") wherein the Court, inter alia, ruled on various motions and discovery 
disputes and instructed the parties, through counsel, to meet and confer on other discovery 
requests. 2 Insofar as the parties have conferred on various occasions and have advised that 
certain discovery disputes remain and additional disputes have arisen, the Court addresses those 
disputes below. 
For ease of reference the Drummond Financial Services, LLC related entities are referred to collectively 
herein as "Plaintiffs" and the TMX Financial Holdings, Inc. related entities are referred to collectively herein as 
"Defendants". 
2 
. See Order on various Pending Motions and Requests (Mar. 13, 2018). 
Fulton County Superior Court
   ***EFILED***AC
Date: 1/22/2019 6:40 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk
A. Applicable standards 
With respect to the general scope of discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(b)(l) provides: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of 
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other 
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible 
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence ... 
(Emphasis added). 
"[I]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very 
broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that is or may become an issue in 
litigation." Bowden v. The Med. Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291, 773 S.E.2d 692, 696 (2015) 
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal quotations 
omitted). The powers of the trial court to control the time, place, scope and financing of 
discovery are construed broadly. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 
589, 452 _S.E.2d 159, 162 (1994), disapproved of on other grounds by Chrysler Grp. LLC v. 
Walden, No. S17G0832, 2018 WL 1323992 (Ga. Mar. 15, 2018); Bicknell v. CBT Factors Corp., 
171 Ga. App. 897, 899, 321 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1984). Further, "an evasive or incomplete answer 
is to be treated as a failure to answer." O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-37(a)(3). See Stephens v. Howle, 132 
Ga. App. 92, 93 207 S.E.2d 632, 633-34 (1974) (holding that trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that plaintiffs responses to interrogatories were invasive or incomplete 
where the plaintiff failed to respond fully in "some of the answers"). 
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B. Documents Related to Buyouts 
Insofar as Defendants' counsel has advised that "all of the emails Plaintiffs seek are 
communications between TMX employees and the TMX Legal Department sent at the direction 
and request of TMX counsel after this litigation began, to aid counsel in addressing the specific 
claims at issue in this case," and that the emails at issue are "documents generated exclusively 
for the limited purpose of defending against Plaintiffs' claims in this litigation," Plaintiffs have 
withdrawn their request that the Court order Defendants to produce these documents. As such, no 
further action from the Court is warranted. 
C. Personnel Files 
The Court previously directed counsel to confer regarding Plaintiffs' discovery requests 
seeking the production of documents from the personnel files of certain individuals who are 
current or former employees of Defendants. Although counsel have conferred, Plaintiffs' counsel 
reports that issues remain regarding the production of documents from TMX employee personnel 
files. Plaintiffs seek certain documents from the personnel files of individuals specifically named 
in Plaintiffs' Third RPO No. 5, to wit: Keith Haberstroh; Leobardo Sanchez; Felix DeLeon; 
James Batterson; Patrick Sudduth; Richard Todd Hale; Radamez Casillas; and Michael Ryan. 
The foregoing individuals are current or former employees of Defendants that, in separate 
Texas litigation involving similar allegations against Defendants, were shown to be involved in 
or aware of unlawful OMV searching. Further, Plaintiffs specifically seek documents from their 
personnel files regarding any OMV searching that occurred outside of Texas. Given these 
individuals have knowledge of the conduct at issue in this action, the Court finds the discovery 
sought is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request to compel is GRANTED and Defendants are ordered to produce 
3 
any documents from the personnel files of the above individuals regarding OMV searching that 
took place outside of Texas. 
Plaintiffs also seek to compel further production regarding their requests for documents 
regarding specific instances of conduct that violated the Interlocutory Injunction previously 
issued in this matter. Defendants agreed to produce documents from the personnel files of certain 
"Named Individuals" whose conduct violated the Interlocutory Injunction as well as their 
"Supervisors." However, Plaintiffs also ask the Court to compel the production of personnel file 
records of an additional 51 "Subordinates" who worked for the "Named Individuals" who may 
have had an opportunity to observe, be trained in or cooperate in such conduct. Insofar as 
Defendants have already produced personal file records of the specific individuals who allegedly 
violated the Court's Interlocutory Injunction, the Court finds the request seeking additional 
personnel file records of dozens of subordinates overbroad and declines to compel production of 
same. 
D. Additional Discovery Disputes Raised by Defendants 
Defendants assert they have conferred with Plaintiffs regarding the foregoing additional 
discovery disputes related to their (1) Third Requests for Production of Documents ("Third 
RPDs"), (2) Amended Third Set of Interrogatories ("Amended Third Interrogatories"), and (3) 
Requests for Production of Documents from Andr, Inc., Atlanta Title Loans, Inc., Aycox & 
Aycox, Clayton, Inc., Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc., Aycox Enterprises, LTD, Aycox, Inc., 
Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc., Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc., LoanMax Title 
Loans, LLC, and Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc., the newly added Plaintiffs3 ("New RPDs"), but 
have been unable to reach an agreement. 
See Order on Pending Motions and Requests (Mar. 13, 2018), pp. 20-22. 
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a. Identification of Plaintif s' "Operations Specialists" and "Traveling Store 
Managers"(Amended Third Interrogatories Nos. 2, 14) 
In its Feb. 12, 2017 Order on Discovery Disputes, the Court ordered that "[t]o the extent 
there are 'Operations Specialists' employed by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs should produce [ certain] 
requested information" including correspondence, phone records, and personnel files upon 
finding such information relevant and likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.4 
In their Amended Third Interrogatories, Defendants request that Plaintiffs identify each 
employee "who currently has or previously had" the title of "operations specialist" or "traveling 
store manager." (Amended Third Interrogatory No. 2) In response, Plaintiffs assert: they ran a 
keyword search for the term "Operations Specialist", produced any responsive documents within 
the agreed upon timeframe for the parties' ESI production and, thus, "have produced documents, 
if any, from which the information requested in Interrogatory No. 2 may be derived"; and "after 
a reasonable investigation, [they] were unable to identify any employee who currently holds the 
title of 'operations specialist" After Defendants sought to compel a complete response to this 
interrogatory, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental discovery response stating that their "human 
resources system reflects that Whitney Hughes, Kristen Tambunga, Roxanna Martin, John 
Denton, Samantha Jeffers, and Edwin Evans have had the title of operations specialist at some 
point in time. "6 
Although Plaintiffs assert they have now "fully answered" this interrogatory "based on 
the best information available to them and there simply is no more information to provide'", 
Defendants have submitted an email exchange dated Sept. 3-4, 2010 between Jesse Anderson 
4 
6 
See Order on Discovery Disputes (Feb. 17, 2017), p. 4. 
Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants Amended Third Set of Interrogatories, No. 2 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Amended Third Set of Interrogatories (Aug. 23, 
2018), No. 2. 
7 Plaintiffs', Sept. 7, 2018, pp. 2-3. 
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(Vice President of Operations of Select Management Resources, LLC) and Annette Frederick, 
Director of Human Resources of Select Management Resources, LLC) stating, inter alia: 
Zach Farmer our current Manager in TX367 has been promoted to 
Operations Specialist (Texas Traveler). His new position was effective as 
of 08-30-2010, his new rate of pay is $40,000.00 salaried. As he has been 
traveling with me all week he will not have hours logged in the system nor 
will he going forward. 8 
Defendants also have submitted documents indicating that Mr. Anderson in his Linkedln profile 
claims to have held the position of Operations Specialist at Select Resource Management, LLC 
from 2002 to 2004. Further, Defendants have submitted an email dated Jul. 3, 2015 from an 
individual named Shannen Slaughter who includes in her signature line the title "Operations 
Specialist.?" Although, as Plaintiffs point out, they may not be able to identify every person who 
held themselves out as an operations specialist, Plaintiffs can search their human resources 
systems and records to identify those individuals that Plaintiffs' executives and human resources 
personnel recognized as Operations Specialists. 
Accordingly, within fifteen (15) days of this order Plaintiffs must search their human 
resources systems and records and supplement their discovery response with any other 
individuals who currently or previously held the title of "operations specialist" or "traveling store 
manager" or must affirmatively advise that no such additional responsive information is 
available to them, and Plaintiffs will be held to their response. To the extent Plaintiffs rely on 
documents produced in discovery to respond to this interrogatory, they cannot generally 
reference their production but must specifically identify by Bates numbering or otherwise which 
documents produced are responsive to this interrogatory. See Hull v. WTI, Inc., 322 Ga. App. 
304, 307-08, 744 S.E.2d 825,829 (2013) (where the trial court held that "the production of over 
8 
9 
Defendants' Letter, Oct. 12, 2018, Ex. A (emphasis added). 
Id. at Ex. C. 
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156,000 pages of documents with insufficient organization, coupled with the failure ... to identify 
which documents are responsive to which ... requests .. .is inconsistent with [the defendant's] 
obligations under the Civil Practice Act"). 
In their Amended Third Interrogatories, Defendants also request that Plaintiffs: 
Describe the creation of the 'Operations Specialist' position, including but 
not limited to who directed that the position be created who devised the 
job functions associated with the position, who supervised the position, 
and job descriptions created or modified, and any public postings for the 
position. 10 
Plaintiffs initially responded that they "are not aware of who created the term operation 
specialist or the circumstances surrounding its creation."! 1 Again, after Defendants sought to 
compel a complete response to this interrogatory, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental response 
stating that "Plaintiffs do not have a job description for operations specialists and Plaintiffs are 
not aware of any public postings for an operation specialist position.v'f 
To the extent Plaintiffs have supplemented their response to affirmatively state they are 
not aware of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the operations specialist position, do 
not have a job description and are not aware of any pubic postings for the position, there is 
nothing further for the Court to compel as to those specific aspects of the interrogatory. 
However, insofar as Plaintiffs have now identified several individuals who held the title (and 
may identify additional such individuals), within fifteen (15) days of this order Plaintiffs shall 
supplement their discovery response to identify the supervisor(s) of each person identified in 
response to Amended Third Interrogatory No. 2. 
10 Defendants' Amended Third Interrogatories, No. 14. 
Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants Amended Third Set oflnterrogatories, No. 14. 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Amended Third Set of Interrogatories (Aug. 7, 
2018), No. 14. 
II 
12 
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b. Identification of Plaintif s' owners, shareholders, and members (Amended 
Third Interrogatory No. 11; New RPD Nos. 1, 3-5; RPD Nos. 25-27) 
Defendants' discovery requests asked Plaintiffs: to identify their parent companies, 
owners, shareholders, members, and their respective ownership shares (Amended Third 
Interrogatory No. 11; New RPD No. 3); to identify their subsidiaries (New RPD No. 4); to 
produce documents sufficient to show Plaintiffs' corporate structure and relationship, including 
any corporate affiliations among Plaintiffs (RPD No. 25; New RPD No. 5); and to produce 
copies of Plaintiffs' articles of incorporation and bylaws (RPD Nos. 26-27; New RPO No. 1). 
In response, Plaintiffs/Responding Parties raise a number of objections including that the 
foregoing requests seek irrelevant information, seek sensitive, competitive and/or proprietary 
business information, and are harassing. They also refer Defendants to other discovery responses 
in which Plaintiffs, inter alia, identify which of the Plaintiffs incorporated after Mar. 1, 1992 
operated a Georgia store and all of Plaintiffs' affiliates that have owned or operated stores in 
Georgia since Dec. 29, 2010. Plaintiffs subsequently provided their articles of incorporation and 
advised through counsel that "Plaintiffs do not have any organizational charts showing 
'affiliations' among Plaintiffs."13 In supplemental responses, Plaintiffs/Responding Parties state: 
(1) No Plaintiff has a parent company; (2) No Plaintiff has any 
subsidiaries; (3) No Plaintiff has ever owned or controlled any other 
Plaintiff, either in whole or in part; (4) Plaintiffs are owned by one or 
more individuals and the "affiliation" between or among Plaintiffs is by 
common ownership and control at the individual shareholder or member 
level. 14 
13 Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), Ex. K; Plaintiffs' Letter (Sept. 7, 2018), Exs. J and K. 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Third Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents, No. 25; Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants Requests for Production of 
Documents from Andr, Inc., Atlanta Title Loans, Inc., Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc., Aycox & Martin Enterprises, 
Inc., Aycox Enterprises, LTD, Aycox, Inc., Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc., Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, 
Inc., LoanMax Title Loans, LLC, and Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc., Nos. 3-5. 
14 
8 
What appears to remain in dispute is whether Plaintiffs should have to identify their 
owners, shareholders, and members and whether they should have to produce internal documents 
that show Plaintiffs' corporate structure to the extent such exists. In their Second Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiffs assert they "are companies affiliated by common ownership and control 
that are engaged in the business of making loans to consumers secured by motor vehicles." 15 In 
their Second Counterclaim, Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs allege Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendants "are engaged in an orchestrated and widespread scheme" involving trespass on 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs' property, theft of trade secrets, and conversion of confidential financial 
data, which allegedly occurred "with the sanction and approval of management.l''" Additionally, 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs allege that, although employees allegedly participating in 
illegal conduct "may have technically been employed by one corporate entity, the information 
they gathered was shared across the Counterclaim Defendants' corporate structure" such that 
they "are all equally liable for their own acts and for the acts of each other as a conspiracy.t''" 
Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs also suggest that Plaintiffs/Counterclaim-Defendants are 
using their corporate affiliations to transfer pawnshops among themselves in an attempt to evade 
liability under the Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-130 et seq. 18 
Given the foregoing allegations, the Court finds the requested information relevant and 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. To the extent responsive 
documents contain confidential/proprietary information, a confidentiality order is in place in this 
action to govern the disclosure and proper use of such information. Thus, within fifteen (15) 
15 Second Amended Complaint, ,57. 
Second Counterclaim by Defendants, ,,14, 45-52. 
Id. at il5 I. Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs also suggest that Plaintiffs/Counterclaim/Defendants are 
using their corporate affiliations to transfer pawnshops among themselves in an attempt to evade liability under the 
Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-130 et seq. See Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), p. 5. 
18 Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), pp. 6-7; Defendants' Letter (Oct. 12, 2018), pp. 4-5. 
16 
17 
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days of this order Plaintiffs shall supplement their discovery responses to identify their owners, 
shareholders, and members and to produce internal documents that show Plaintiffs' internal 
corporate structure or to affirmatively state that no such responsive documents are in their 
possession, custody, or control. 
c. Disclosure of Georgia pawnshop stores owned/operated by Plaintif s 
(Amended Third Interrogatories Nos. 10-11; RPD Nos. 8, 12, 35; New RPD 
Nos. 6-8) 
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs: provide a corporate ownership history for all stores 
operated by Plaintiffs or their affiliates in Georgia (Amended Third Interrogatory No. 1 O); 
identify all shareholders, members, directors and officers for each Plaintiff who at any time 
owned or operated a Georgia store for the period of Dec. 29, 2010 to the present (Amended 
Third Interrogatory No. 11, addressed supra); produce documents reflecting the transfer of 
ownership of any of Plaintiffs' stores located in Georgia since Dec. 29, 2014 (RPO No. 8); 
produce documents relating to the sale or transfer of interest of any stores owed/operated by 
Plaintiffs in Georgia since the filing of this action (RPO No. 12); and documents sufficient to 
identify the location and dates of operation of Plaintiffs' stores (RPD No. 35). Similarly, 
Defendants requested that newly added Plaintiffs produce documents identifying their 
pawnbroker stores, trade names, and licenses to operation (New RPD Nos. 6-8). 
In response, Plaintiffs refer to a list of stores in Georgia that Plaintiffs or their affiliates 
owned or operated for the period of Dec. 29, 2010 through Jun. 1, 2017. They also provided 
certain information for nine stores owned by certain Plaintiffs formed after Mar. 1, 1992, taking 
the position that only such information is relevant to this litigation. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §44-12- 
138(a)(l) ("A pawnbroker shall not use the term 'loan' in any advertisements or in connection 
with any advertising of the business of the pawnbroker; provided, however, that the provisions of 
10 
this sentence shall not apply to a pawnbroker in business on March 1, 1992, which uses the term 
'loan' in connection with the name of the business or with advertising of the business"). 
The parties generally dispute the scope of the Georgia Pawnshop Act, its applicability to 
the parties/their stores, and whether entities can escape liability under the Act through the 
transfer of ownership of the stores. 19 Nevertheless, insofar as the ownership history of Plaintiffs' 
stores, the sale/transfer of ownership interests, store locations, dates of operation, trade names, 
and business licenses are relevant to this dispute, the Court finds these discovery requests seek 
relevant information and are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As such, 
within fifteen (15) days of this order Plaintiffs shall supplement and provide full responses to 
the above discovery requests to the extent they have not already done so and to the extent such is 
in their possession, custody or control.f" 
d. Marketing of title pawns as "loans" (RPD Nos. 7, 9, 10, 23, 24; New RPD 
Nos. 9-10/1 
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs: provide copies of Georgia advertisements using the 
word "loan" from Dec. 29, 2010 to the present and revenues attributable thereto (RPD Nos. 7, 9); 
documents reflecting Plaintiffs' decision to use the word "loan" in Georgia instead of "pawn"); 
(RPO No. 1 O); copies of signage permit applications (RPO No. 23); and complaints generated as 
a result of Plaintiffs' advertising activities (RPO No. 24). Similarly, Defendants served discovery 
on the newly added Plaintiffs asking them to produce any advertisements using the word "loan" 
and to produce documents reflecting their attempts to comply with the Georgia Pawnshop Act 
(New RPO Nos. 9-10). 
19 Compare Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), pp. 6-7; Plaintiffs' Letter (Sept. 7, 2018), pp.5-6; Defendants' 
Letter (Oct. 12, 2018), pp. 4-5. 
20 With respect to RPD No. 35, Plaintiffs do not have to produce every document referencing their store 
locations and dates of operations but rather must produce documents sufficient to identify each store location and 
dates of operation. 
21 New RPD Nos. 6-8 are addressed in Part I(D)(c), supra. 
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Given the allegations in Defendants First Counterclaim (as set forth in their Answer and 
Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' Amended Counterclaim), 
the Court finds the foregoing requests are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence relevant to the parties' claims and defenses. To the extent responsive 
documents contain confidential/proprietary information, a confidentiality order is in place in this 
action to govern the disclosure and proper use of such information. Plaintiffs are ordered to 
supplement and provide full responses to the above discovery requests within fifteen (15) days 
of this order. 
e. Benefits derived from alleged theft of trade secrets (Amended Third 
Interrogatories Nos. 7-9; RPD Nos. 19-21, 28-29, 36) 
Defendants served a number of requests related to their claim that Plaintiffs stole 
Defendants' financial and market data by sending "Secret Shoppers" to Defendants' stores to 
photograph their "Goal Boards": 
Amended Third Interrogatory No. 7: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within 
a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper 
photographed Goal Boards, describe (a) all staffing changes that occurred 
within one year of the photographs being taken, and identify the names of 
the employees making the changes and effected by the changes; and (b) all 
changes in marketing expenditures that occurred within one year of the 
photographs being taken, and identify the changes made, the persons 
implementing the changes, and the decision maker behind the changes. 
(Emphasis added) 
Amended Third Interrogatory No. 8: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within 
a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper 
photographed Goal Boards, identify any lease renewals or lease 
terminations at those stores that occurred within eighteen months of the 
photographs being taken, and identify those individuals involved with the 
renewals/terminations and the decision maker on the renewal or 
termination. (Emphasis added) 
Amended Third Interrogatory No. 9: Identify any of Plaintiffs' stores 
that have opened between January 1, 2011 and the present that is 
located within a 10-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores, including 
12 
any proposals outlining the reason(s) the location was determined to be a 
viable location. (Emphasis added) 
RPD No. 19: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within a 30-mile radius of any 
of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards, 
produce copies of lease renewals or lease terminations at those stores that 
occurred within eighteen months of the photographs being taken. 
(Emphasis added) 
RPD No. 20: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within a 30-mile radius of any 
of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards, 
produce documents sufficient to show any staffing changes at those stores 
that occurred within eighteen months of the photographs being taken. 
(Emphasis added) 
RPD No. 21: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within a 30-mile radius of any 
of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards, 
produce documents sufficient to show any changes in marketing 
(including but not limited to changes in marketing budget, marketing 
methods, and marketing strategy) at those stores that occurred within 
eighteen months of the photographs being taken. (Emphasis added) 
RPD No. 28: Documents sufficient to show any employee performance 
plans or incentive plans for Plaintiffs' employees who worked at stores 
within a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret 
Shopper photographed Goal Boards. (Emphasis added) 
RPD No. 29: Documents sufficient to show the rates of hourly pay, 
salaries, bonuses, and changes in rates of pay or salaries for Plaintiffs' 
employees who · worked at stores within a 30 mile radius of any of 
Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards for 
a period of six (6) months before and six (6) months after a Secret 
Shopper photographed Goal Boards. (Emphasis added) 
RPD No. 36: Documents sufficient to show the change in volume of loans 
or pawns (both in number and dollar value) at any of Plaintiffs' stores 
within a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret 
Shopper photographed Goal Boards for a period of six (6) months before 
and six (6) months after each date when a Secret Shopper photographed 
Goal Boards. 
(Emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs object to these discovery requests on various grounds asserting, inter alia, that 
13 
the requests are overly broad, unduly burdensome, without sufficient temporal or geographic 
limitation, seek irrelevant information, and seek confidential/proprietary information. The Court 
finds the requested information is relevant to Defendants' trade secret claim. To the extent 
responsive documents contain confidential/proprietary information, a confidentiality order is in 
place in this action to govern the disclosure and proper use of such information. 
Nevertheless, the Court finds the requests are generally overly broad and without 
sufficient temporal or geographic limitation. Thus, the Court: narrows the requests 
geographically to information related to Plaintiffs' stores located within a two (2) mile radius of 
any of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards (Amended Third 
Interrogatories Nos. 7-9; RPO Nos. 19-21, 28-29, 36), similar to the geographic restrictions 
initially placed on similar discovery requests made in the parties' related Texas litigation. The 
Court also narrows the requests temporally with respect to staff changes (Amended Third 
Interrogatory No. 7; RPO No. 20), marketing changes (Amended Third Interrogatory No. 7; RPO 
No. 21 ), and lease renewals or terminations {Amended Third Interrogatory No. 8; RPO No. 19) 
to that occurring within twelve months (12) months of the photographs being taken. Plaintiffs 
shall supplement their responses accordingly within fifteen (15) days of this order. 
f. Employee contracts relevant to tortious interference claim (RPD No. 4) 
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Defendants unlawfully solicited 
the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' employees by offering cash to divert current and prospective 
customers from the Direct Lender Plaintiffs to Defendants and, in so doing, sought to have the 
employees breach their employment contracts with and their duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs.22 
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs produce copies of any employee contracts that it contends 
were breached because of Defendants' alleged conduct (RPO No. 4). 
22 Second Amended Complaint, ilil 135-136. 
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In response, Plaintiffs produced three "standard form employee" contracts but did not 
produce any specific employee contracts. Plaintiffs also identified individuals they are currently 
aware of who may have received a referral fee from Defendants. However, Plaintiffs assert that 
although they have repeatedly requested that Defendants identify Plaintiffs' employees to whom 
Defendants paid referral fees, Defendants have not provided a substantive response thereby 
impeding progress with respect to Defendants' discovery request. 
The Court finds the information requested by Defendants regarding the employee 
contracts at issue with respect to Plaintiffs' tortious interference claim is relevant and reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Similarly, and as set forth in Part l(E), 
infra, the Court finds Plaintiffs' discovery request seeking information regarding Plaintiffs' 
employees who were paid referral fees by Defendants is relevant and reasonably calculated to 
lead to discovery of admissible evidence. Thus, upon the parties' compliance with the Court's 
ruling in Part I(E), Plaintiffs shall supplement their discovery responses with the specific 
employee contracts at issue with respect to their tortious interference claim or, alternatively, shall 
affirmatively state that the standard form contracts already produced are identical to every 
employee contract allegedly breached and provide the employee's name, title, store number, 
store location, the date of the agreement, and the date of termination. 
g. Disclosure of similar litigation (RPD No. 11) 
In this litigation Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are "engaged in a nationwide campaign 
to systematically and illegally steal Plaintiffs' customers" by, inter alia, unlawfully obtaining 
personal information about Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers from OMV records to 
solicit and divert those customers.23 Plaintiffs' claims for misappropriation of its trade secrets, 
unfair competition, tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts 
23 Second Amended Complaint, i1,r 2, 78-104. 
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and business relationships, trespass, and civil conspiracy are predicated in part on the allegedly 
unlawful use of such DMV records. 
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs produce: "All documents (including but not limited 
to any demand letters, complaints and settlement agreements) regarding any lawsuits filed or 
threatened by Plaintiffs against any third party for improper or unlawful use or hosting of DMV 
records or DMV information, including but not limited to any company that hosts DMV records 
or DMV information on a database or website, and any competitor alleged to be using such 
DMV records or DMV information." (RPD No. 11). Defendants assert this request is relevant to 
Plaintiffs' trade secret claim and whether Plaintiffs derive value from and attempt to protect this 
alleged trade secret information from competitors that engage in the same alleged conduct. 
The Court finds this request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence regarding the trade secrets claim but finds the request for "all" such 
documents related to other litigation overly broad and unduly burdensome. Plaintiffs are ordered 
to, within fifteen (15) days of this order, supplemental their production with any demand letters 
and complaints regarding any lawsuits filed or threatened by Plaintiffs against third party entities 
(other than Defendants and their affiliates) for improper or unlawful use or hosting of DMV 
records or DMV information. 
E. Additional Discovery Disputes Raised by Plaintiffs 
As noted above, in this litigation Plaintiffs allege Defendants offered referral fees to 
Plaintiffs' employees to "bribe" them to divert current and prospective customers from Plaintiffs 
to Defendants.24 Plaintiffs' claims for unfair competition, tortious interference with the Direct 
Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships, trespass, and civil conspiracy 
are predicated in part on the allegedly unlawful solicitation of Plaintiffs' employees. In 
24 Second Amended Complaint, iii! 3, 107-112. 
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Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defendants, Plaintiffs asked Defendants to identify: all of 
Defendants' employees who offered to pay or paid a referral fee to any employee or agent of 
Plaintiffs in exchange for the referral of business; a description of the compensation offered or 
paid; the amount of the compensation paid or value offered; the date the compensation was paid; 
the contact information of the person who paid the compensation; and the identity and contact 
information of the person to whom the compensation was paid. 25 
With respect to this discovery request, the parties previously discussed engaging an 
independent, third party to compare a list of Defendants' referral fee payments with a list of 
Plaintiffs' employees. Specifically, Defendants' referral fee payment information would be 
cross-referenced with the names of Plaintiffs' employees and the search "hit" would be a 
potential responsive match if the name and residence or place of employment of the employee 
matched the same geographic area as Defendants' store from which the referral fee check was 
issued. However, the parties ultimately could not agree on (I) the appropriate geographic filters 
to use in relation to Plaintiffs' employees for the comparison process, (2) the relevant time period 
for the search, and (3) the Defendant entities at issue. 
Defendants argue the request is too broad and unduly burdensome and that Plaintiffs in 
the Second Amended Compliant merely allege that Defendants "offered" to pay Plaintiffs' 
employees a referral fee but do not allege (and have no proof) any such referral fees were 
actually paid to Plaintiffs' employees. Thus, Defendants ask the Court to deny the discovery 
request altogether. The Court disagrees. To the extent Defendants contend a propounding party is 
required to prove its allegation before it may seek discovery to support it, such does not align 
with Georgia law. See Bowden, 297 Ga. at 291 ("[I]n the discovery context, courts should and 
ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that 
25 Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defendants, Interrogatory No. 7. 
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is or may become an issue in litigation"); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adler, 254 Ga. App. 500, 
505, 562 S.E.2d 809, 814 (2002) ("[T]he courts of this State have long recognized the overriding 
policy of liberally construing the application of the discovery law. To hold otherwise would be to 
give every litigant an effective veto of his adversaries' attempts at discovery'') (citing DeLoitte 
Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376-377, 370 S.E.2d 194 (1988)). 
Insofar as the alleged payment ofreferral fees to Plaintiffs' employees is squarely at issue 
in this action and the Second Amended Complaint includes numerous, specific allegations that 
such fees were repeatedly offered to Plaintiffs' employees (including during the pendency of this 
action),26 the Court finds the discovery request is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence. The request to compel a response to Interrogatory No. 7 is 
hereby GRANTED IN PART but the request is narrowed to information in Defendants' 
possession, custody, or control regarding referral fees actually paid to Plaintiffs' employees.27 
Further, the Court finds the use of an independent third party to cross-reference the relevant 
information, with expenses of the third party reviewer split equally, is an appropriate and 
reasonable mechanism to narrow the request and reduce the burdens associated therewith. 
Thus, to the extent the parties can agree to proceed with a third-party reviewer, the Court 
directs as follows: With request to the geographic filter to use in the comparison process, the 
state of the Plaintiffs' employee's residence or place of employee should be used as first 
suggested in Defendants' Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' First 
Interrogatories to Defendants.28 The relevant time period for the search should be Nov. 7, 2010, 
26 See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, iMl I 08-11 I, Ex. I. 
The Court previously granted "Plaintiffs' request to compel complete responses" to First Interrogatory No. 
7 and ordered Defendants "to answer and produce any responsive documents in their possession, custody, or 
control." See Order on Pending Motions and Requests (Mar. I 3, 20 I 8), pp. 27-29. The Court narrows that ruling as 
set forth herein. 
28 
27 
Defendants' Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defendants, 
Interrogatory No. 7, Supplemental Response. 
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which encompasses the applicable statute oflimitations for Plaintiffs' tortious interference claim. 
Finally, the search should be limited to referral fees paid by the named Defendants. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS 
A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 
A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless: 
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the 
claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable 
facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that 
the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the 
framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the 
relief sought.. .. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be 
construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts 
regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor. 
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 
267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308, 309, 800 S.E.2d 
366,368 (2017). 
B. Analysis and Conclusions of Law 
In Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and 
Defendants' Amended Counterclaims29, Defendants allege Plaintiffs "with the sanction and 
approval of management, have entered storefronts belonging to Counterclaim Plaintiffs under 
false pretenses with the express purpose of obtaining [Defendants'] trade secrets and confidential 
and proprietary financial information.t''" Specifically, Defendants allege Plaintiffs' employees 
(allegedly known as "Operations Specialists"): would go to Defendants' stores to fill out pawn 
applications; ask to use the restroom located in a non-public area; on the way to and from the 
restroom they would allegedly trespass on non-public areas to photograph Defendants' 
29 
30 
Hereinafter "Defs' Amended Counterclaims". 
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC iJ45. 
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confidential and proprietary information located on '"goal boards', which are summarizes of 
sales targets (based on past performance) and financial progress"; and then they would email the 
photographs to their supervisors.31 
In particular, Defendants allege Zachary Farmer (allegedly one of Plaintiffs' Operation 
Specialists) visited approximately 75 of Defendants' stores in multiple states including South 
Carolina and Alabama for the purpose of photographing Defendants' goal boards, and he 
photographed approximately 30 such goal boards. Another individual believed to be Holly 
Calloway allegedly texted her supervisor photographs of Defendants' goal boards taken inside of 
one of Defendants' stores in Ohio.32 Based on the foregoing allegations, Defendants' Second 
Counterclaim asserts claims for: trespass; misappropriation and theft of trade secrets; Georgia 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"); conversion (in the alternative); 
civil conspiracy; and litigation expenses. 33 
a. Choice of law analysis with respect to Defendants' misappropriation of 
trade secrets claim 
Insofar as the law of the state where the tortious conduct occurred governs Defendants' 
claim, Plaintiffs move to dismiss the trade secrets claim brought under the Georgia Trade Secrets 
Act (Georgia "TSA") for any "goal boards" conduct that allegedly occurred in Ohio, Texas, 
Alabama, or South Carolina. Defendants, in turn, urge that Georgia law should apply because the 
31 Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ,Ml 46-52. 
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ,1,149-50. 
Defendants' Second Counterclaim is brought by Defendants: TitleMax of Alabama, Inc.; TitleMax of 
Arizona, Inc.; TitleMax of Ohio, Inc.; TitleMax of Utah, Inc.; TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.; TitleMax of Missouri, Inc.; 
TitleMax of Texas, Inc.; TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc.; and TitleMax of Virginia, Inc. The Second Counterclaim 
is asserted against Plaintiffs: Anderson Financial Services, LLC; Andr, Inc.; Atlanta Title Loans, Inc.; Aycox, Inc.; 
Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc.; Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc.; Aycox Enterprises, Ltd.; Cash Loans of Marietta, 
Inc.; Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc.; Drummond Financial Services, LLC; Fairfax Financial Services, LLC; 
Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc.; Kipling Financial Services, LLC; LoanMax, LLC; 
LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; LoanSmart, LLC; Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc.; Meadowwood Financial Services, 
LLC; Mid-American Title Loans, LLC; North American Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company; 
North American Title Loans, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a 
South Carolina limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
Select Management Funding, LLC; and Wellshire Financial Services, LLC. 
32 
33 
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financial injury from the misappropriation occurred in Georgia and because applying foreign law 
to Defendants' claims would invite inconsistent results and inefficiency. 
As this Court previously noted when considering a conflict of laws analysis with respect 
to Plaintiffs' misappropriation of trade secrets claim: 
Under Georgia law, the lex loci delicti determines the substantive 
rights of the parties. Ohio Southern Express Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga. 
App. 867, 868(1), 140 S.E.2d 235. How do we determine the lex 
loci delicti where the tort is transitory in nature? The general rule is 
that "the place of wrong, the locus delicti, is the place where the 
injury sustained was suffered rather than the place where the act 
was committed, or, as it is sometimes more generally put, it is the 
place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an 
alleged tort takes place." 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, § 12(2)(b), 
459. Georgia follows the general rule: In Wardell v. Richmond 
Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga. App. 378, 210 S.E.2d 854, we 
observed that " 'The law of the place where the tort or wrong has 
been committed is the law by which the liability is to be 
determined, and the place of the wrong is the place where ... there 
takes place the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an 
alleged tort.' " Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., supra, at p. 
380, 210 S.E.2d 854, quoting Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, 253 
F.Supp. 119, 121 (N.D.Ga.1966). 
Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903-04, 324 S.E.2d 
738, 740 (1984). See Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 292 Ga. 748, 750, 740 S.E.2d 622, 625 
(2013). 
The Court, again, finds that the lex loci delicti is the place where the tortious act of 
misappropriation and use of the trade secret occurred. See, e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 
F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (11th Cir. 2005) (where Ohio company brought trade secrets claim under 
Ohio and Georgia law against former employee who previously worked for the company in 
Florida but took a job in Georgia with a competitor and where Ohio company alleged it had 
entrusted former employee with trade secret information that would inevitability be used during 
employment with Georgia competitor, Georgia law governed); Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux 
21 
Labs., 1nc., 735 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd as modified, 908 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(Georgia law, rather than Iowa law, applied to poultry vaccine manufacturer's claim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information because, although the vaccine 
allegedly misappropriated by competitor was developed in Iowa, misappropriation and use of 
trade secrets occurred at competitor's Georgia laboratory). 34 
Insofar as the TSA of the state where the alleged misappropriation occurred governs, 
Defendants cannot assert a GTSA claim for the alleged "goal boards" conduct that occurred in 
Ohio, Texas, South Carolina, or Alabama. Nevertheless, given the allegations asserted in 
Defendants' Amended Counterclaim and under Georgia's liberal notice pleading, Defendants 
have asserted and may pursue misappropriation of trade secrets claims under the respective state 
TSAs where the alleged misappropriation occurred. 
b. Preemption of Counts I, III, W, Vand VI of the Second Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants claims of trespass, violation of the Georgia RICO 
Act, conversion, civil conspiracy, and attorney's fees that are based on any alleged 
misappropriation of confidential or proprietary information that occurred in Ohio or Alabama are 
superseded and preempted by Ohio's and Alabama's TSA, respectively. 
The Ohio TSA "displace[ s] conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of th[ e] state 
providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret" but does not affect "[ o ]ther civil 
remedies that are not based on misappropriation of a trade secret." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§1333.67. "The preemption section of the [Ohio] TSA has been interpreted to bar claims which 
34 See also TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., LLC, 300 Ga. 835, 838-39 n.7, 797 S.E.2d 
842, 846 (2017) (in reviewing an interlocutory injunction previously issued in this matter and in considering whether 
Plaintiffs showed there was a substantial likelihood that they would prevail on the merits of their claim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations "do not constitute a misappropriation of trade 
secrets in Georgia" but noting Plaintiffs "may have a better chance of success on the merits of [their] claim of 
misappropriation of trade secrets under the laws of other states" other than Georgia) ( emphasis added). 
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are based entirely on factual allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets." Glasstech, Inc. v. 
TGL Tempering Sys., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1999). "In other words, a claim 
is preempted if it is 'no more than a restatement of the same operative facts which would plainly 
and exclusively spell out only trade secret appropriation."' Jedson Eng'g, Inc. v. Spirit Constr. 
Servs., Inc., No. 1 :08CV413, 2010 WL 11538008, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2010) (citing 
Glasstech, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 730. See Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prod., Inc., 
933 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ("Where the common-law claim possesses an 
independent factual basis separate from the factual allegations establishing a UTSA claim, then 
the portion of the claim supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption") ( citing 
Int'I Paper Co. v. Goldschmidt, 872 F.Supp.2d 624,635 (S.D. Ohio 2012). 
Similarly, the Alabama TSA "replace[s] common law tort remedies for the 
misappropriation of trade secrets." Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 37 (Ala. 1991). 
Thus, a claimant "may not pursue both statutory and common law theories of recovery for 
the ... alleged misappropriation of 'trade secrets' or confidential documents." Bell Aerospace 
Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (holding 
plaintiff "may not pursue its breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under a theory that is essentially the 
same as its ATSA claim"). 
i. Trespass 
"Every act which unlawfully interferes with a private property owner's absolute right to 
enjoy its property is a tort for which an action shall lie. A person commits trespass when he 
knowingly and without authority enters upon the land of another after having received prior 
notice that such entry is forbidden." Pope v. Pulte Horne Corp., 246 Ga. App. 120, 120, 539 
S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (2000) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Rababy v. Metter, 2015- 
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Ohio-1449, ,r 23, 30 N.E.3d 1018, 1025 ("[T]he elements of a successful trespass claim are an 
unauthorized intentional act, and entry upon law in the possession of another"); Drummond Co. 
v. Walter Indus., Inc., 962 So. 2d 753, 782 (Ala. 2006) ("[T]he gist of any trespass action is 
the interference with a right to possession of property"). 
Here, Defendants allege Plaintiffs "have intentionally intruded upon [their] property for 
the purpose of obtaining [their] confidential financial information" and assert such "intrusions 
were without [Defendants'] consent.v" Insofar as "the operative facts of the trespass claim relate 
to the interference with [Defendants'] property rights" (see Jedson Eng'g, Inc. v., No. 
1 :08CV413, 2010 WL 11538008, at *6) and are based on an entirely different "theor[y] of 
recovery" than a misappropriation of trade secrets claim (compare Bell Aerospace Servs., Inc., 
690 F. Supp. 2d at 1277; Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 37 (Ala. 1991)), the Court 
finds the common law trespass claim is not preempted by the Ohio TSA or the Alabama TSA. 
Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the trespass claim. 
ii. RICO Claim 
Under Georgia's RICO statute, it is "unlawful for any person, through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, 
including money." O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a). Similarly, it is unlawful for "any person employed by 
or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such 
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." O.C.G.A. 16-14-4-(b). A "racketeering 
activity," also known as a "predicate act," is the commission of, the attempt to commit, or the 
solicitation or coercing of another to commit a "crime which is chargeable by indictment" under 
certain laws of the state of Georgia and the United States. O.C.G.A. §16-14-3(5). 
35 Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC 1il 54-55. 
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Defendants allege Plaintiffs violated the Georgia RICO Act "by engaging in a pattern of 
racketeering activity, the purpose and result of which was to steal [Defendants'] trade secrets" 
and assert that "[t]hrough this pattern of racketeering, [Plaintiffs] have acquired an interest in or 
control of personal property, including Defendants' trade secrets."36 Insofar as the Ohio TSA 
expressly does not affect "criminal remedies ... whether or not based on misappropriation of a 
trade secret" (see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.67(8)(3)) and whereas the Alabama TSA only 
preempts "common law theories of recovery" for the misappropriation of trade secrets (see 
Allied Supply Co., 585 So. 2d at 37), the Courts finds the Georgia RICO claim is not 
preempted.37 Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the RICO claim. 
iii. Conversion 
"[C]onversion consists of an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of 
ownership over personal property belonging to another, in hostility to his rights; an act of 
dominion over the personal property of another inconsistent with his rights; or an unauthorized 
appropriation." Nash v. United Bank-Thomaston, 319 Ga. App. 179, 181, 734 S.E.2d 238,241 
(2012). See also Dice v. White Family Cos., 2007-0hio-5755, ,r 17, 173 Ohio App. 3d 472,477, 
878 N.E.2d 1105, 1108-09 ("Conversion is an exercise of dominion or control wrongfully 
exerted over property in denial of or under a claim inconsistent with the rights of another"); Ex 
parte Anderson, 867 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (Ala. 2003) ("To prove conversion, [a plaintiff] must 
present evidence of a wrongful taking or a wrongful detention or interference, or an illegal 
assumption of ownership, or an illegal use or misuse") ( citations and punctuation omitted). 
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC iM! 66-67. 
Indeed, although not squarely addressed in the parties' papers, it is questionable whether any Georgia court 
has held or would hold that another state's trade secret laws preempt a claim otherwise authorized under Georgia 
statute. 
36 
37 
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Here, Defendants assert a claim of conversion "in the altemative".38 They allege 
Plaintiffs, through the actions of their employees, "have wrongly asserted dominion over 
[Defendants'] property, namely their confidential financial information, inconsistent with 
[Defendants'] right of ownership."39 Specifically, they allege Plaintiffs "unlawfully and 
knowingly came into actual possession of Counterclaim Plaintiffs' confidential financial 
information" and used it "for their own benefit.?" The Court finds Defendants' alternative, 
common law conversion claim, which is predicated on the unlawful taking and use of their 
confidential financial information rests on the exact same facts and theory of recovery as their 
misappropriation of trade secrets claim and, thus, it is preempted under the Ohio TSA and 
Alabama TSA. Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect to the conversion 
claim. 
iv. Civil Conspiracy 
"A claim of civil conspiracy requires a pleading of facts showing that two or more 
persons, acting in concert, engaged in conduct that constitutes a tort. Absent the underlying tort, 
there can be no liability for civil conspiracy." Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334 
Ga. App. 826, 835, 780 S.E.2d 689, 697 (2015) ( citation and punctuation omitted). See also 
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 1998-Ohio-294, 83 Ohio St. 3d 464, 475, 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 ("The 
tort of civil conspiracy is a malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another in 
person or property, in a way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages ... An 
underlying unlawful act is required before a civil conspiracy claim can succeed") (citations and 
punctuation omitted); Hooper v. Columbus Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 956 So. 2d 1135, 1141 
38 Defs' Amended Counterclaims at p. 57 (title to Second Counterclaim, "Count IV Conversion (In the 
Alternative"). 
39 Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ,i 76. 
40 Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2"d CC i1,i 78- 79. 
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(Ala. 2006) ("Civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an 
unlawful end or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means ... The gist of an action alleging 
civil conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself but, rather, the wrong committed") (citations and 
punctuation omitted). 
Here, Defendants allege Plaintiffs "have conspired with each other to engage in trespass, 
misappropriation or theft of trade secrets, actions prohibited by Georgia's RICO law, and 
conversion."41 Given the Court's rulings above, there remain claims for trespass, 
misappropriation or theft of trade secrets, and violation of Georgia's RICO Act that are not 
preempted and for which Defendant have at least stated a claim for civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs' 
Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the civil conspiracy claim. 
v. Litigation Expenses 
Defendants seek an award of their litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, alleging 
Plaintiffs "have acted in bad faith, been stubbornly litigious, and have cause[d] [Defendants] 
unnecessary trouble and expenses.':" Importantly, "O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 does not create an 
independent cause of action" but rather "merely establishes the circumstances in which a 
plaintiff may recover the expenses of litigation as an additional element of his damages." 
Gardner v. Kinney, 230 Ga. App. 771, 772, 498 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1998). Here, insofar as claims 
remain that are not preempted, Defendants have at least stated a claim for relief under O.C.G.A. 
§ 13-6-11. Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to this claim. 
41 
42 
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ii 83. 
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC 1il 88-89. 
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III. Motions regarding noticed depositions 
Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a protective order quashing the proposed 
depositions of Rod Aycox (Chief Executive Officer and managing member of certain Plaintiffs 
and an affiliated company called Select Management Resources, Inc.) and Jesse Anderson 
(Plaintiffs' Vice President of Operations in Texas).43 Similarly, Defendants request that the Court 
enter an order quashing the proposed deposition of Tracy Young (the primary stakeholder in 
TMX Finance, LLC and the Chief Executive Officer of TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. and its 
affiliates)." Opposing parties are directed to submit any response to the foregoing requests 
within ten (10) days of this order after which the Court will take these matters under 
advisement. 
IV. Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
Pending before the Court are two partial motions for summary judgment: Defendant- 
Counterclaim Plaintiff TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and 
Plaintiffs North American Title Loans, LLC and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.'s Twenty-Third Defense and 
Counterclaim for Unfair Competition. A hearing on the foregoing motions shall be held on Feb. 
28, 2018 at 10:00 AM. The hearing will take place in Courtroom 8H of the Fulton County 
Courthouse, 136 Pryor Street, SW, 9th Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. A court reporter will not be 
provided. If the parties wish for the hearing or any other court proceeding to be taken down, 
counsel must confer and make appropriate arrangements to have a court reporter present. 
43 
44 
Plaintiffs' Letter dated Jan. 4, 2019. 
Defendants' Letter dated Jan. 10, 2019. 
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SO ORDERED this V. 2/ day ofJanuary, 2019. 
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